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This paper reviews the process of job creation and destruction across a sample
of 16 industrial and emerging economies over the past decade. It exploits a harmo-
nized ﬁrm-level data-set drawn from business registers and enterprise census data.
The paper assesses the importance of technological factors that characterize diﬀerent
industries in explaining cross-country diﬀerences in job ﬂows. It shows that indus-
try eﬀects play an important role in shaping job ﬂows at the aggregate level. Even
more importantly, diﬀerences in the size composition of ﬁrms - within each industry
- explain a large fraction of the overall variability in job creation and destruction.
However, even after controlling for industry/technology and size factors there re-
main signiﬁcant diﬀerences in job ﬂows across countries that could reﬂect diﬀerences
in business environment conditions. In this paper, we look at one factor shaping
the business environment, namely, regulations on hiring and ﬁring of workers. To
minimize possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems associated with cross-
country regressions, we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach. The empirical results
suggest that stringent hiring and ﬁring costs reduce job turnover, especially in those
industries that require more frequent labor adjustment. Regulations also distort the
patterns of industry/size ﬂows. Within each industry, medium and large ﬁrms are
more severely aﬀected by stringent labor regulations, while small ﬁrms are less af-
fected, probably because they are partially exempted from such regulations or can
more easily circumvent them.
JEL Classiﬁcation: J23, J53, K31.
Keywords: gross job ﬂows, ﬁrm dynamics, ﬁrm size, product and labor market reg-
ulations, ﬁrm-level data.
21 Introduction
Over the past decade, a growing body of evidence has accumulated suggesting that the
reallocation of factors of production - including labor - plays a major role in driving pro-
ductivity growth (see for example Olley and Pakes [1996], Griliches and Regev [1995],
Foster et al. [2001], Foster et al. [2002] and Bartelsman et al. [2004]). New ﬁrms enter the
market and create new jobs, while other unproﬁtable ﬁrms exit the market contributing
to job destruction (see e.g. Sutton [1997], Pakes and Ericson [1998], Geroski [1995]). In-
cumbent ﬁrms are in a continuous process of adaptation in response to the development of
new products and processes, the growth and decline in markets and changes in competitive
forces (Davis and Haltiwanger [1999]). Market conditions and institutional factors play
a major role in shaping the magnitude of job ﬂows and their characteristics (Davis et al.
[1996]). For example, smaller businesses are inherently more dynamic, in part because they
tend to be young ventures and adjust through a learning-by-doing process (Dunne et al.
[1988], Dunne et al. [1989]). In addition, some industries have inherently higher job ﬂows
(Foster et al. [2002] report that job ﬂows in the United States retail sector are 1.5 times
higher than in the manufacturing sector) than others in all countries, given the smaller size
of their typical business and lower inherent entry costs.
Technological and market driven factors are coupled with a host of regulations in driv-
ing job ﬂows. For example, regulations aﬀecting start-up costs or bankruptcy procedures
are likely to aﬀect ﬁrm turnover and the associated labor mobility. Likewise, employ-
ment protection legislation may stiﬂe labor reallocation by raising labor adjustment costs.
Assessing the role of regulations in aﬀecting job ﬂows, over and above that played by tech-
nological and market-driven factors, is of great importance. While labor reallocation is
indeed important to promote productivity growth, it is also painful for the aﬀected work-
ers, who face signiﬁcant search and other adjustment costs (see for example Mortensen and
Pissarides [1999a], Mortensen and Pissarides [1999b] and Caballero and Hammour [2000b]).
Several models predict that labor regulations reduce gross job ﬂows (e.g. Bertola [1992],
Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993]), but the empirical evidence is still inconclusive. While
several empirical papers ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of employment protection legislation on un-
employment (Bentolila and Bertola [1990], Nickell and Layard [1999]), the eﬀects on job
reallocation are more nuanced (Bertola and Rogerson [1997], Boeri [1999]). Countries with
diﬀerent types of labor regulations are observed to have fairly similar gross job ﬂows. The
lack of a causal relationship between regulations and gross job ﬂows at the aggregate level
may be due to diﬀerent elements. Stringent labor regulations may be associated with other
regulatory and institutional factors that also aﬀect job ﬂows. For example, Bertola and
Rogerson [1997] argue that countries with strict regulations also tend to have institutions
3that restrict the ability of ﬁrms to adjust wages in response to a shock (e.g. centralized
wage bargaining). A more fundamental problem is that cross-country analyses of job ﬂows
may be ﬂawed by severe omitted variable problems and measurement errors, including dif-
ferences in the distribution of activity across industries and size of ﬁrms, as well as diﬀerent
cut-oﬀ points in the enterprise surveys from which job ﬂow data are obtained.
In this paper, we draw from a harmonized and integrated ﬁrm-level dataset including
16 developed, emerging and transition economies. With these data, we explore the industry
and size dimensions of the job ﬂows in detail and relate them to institutional diﬀerences
across countries.1 To give a preview of our results, we ﬁnd that countries share a number of
features of job ﬂows along the industry and size dimensions. All countries are characterized
by large job ﬂows. These vary signiﬁcantly and systematically across industries, pointing
to technological and market-driven factors, but especially across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes.
However, there are notable cross-country diﬀerences even after controlling for industry
and size eﬀects. Thus, we develop a formal test of the links between hiring and ﬁring
regulations and jobs ﬂows in this paper, and also test for the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of other regulations aﬀecting business operations. We use a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence approach whereby we identify an industry and size class’s baseline job reallocation
from the United States data. Under the assumption that regulations in the United States
are among the least restrictive in our sample, the baseline should proxy for the technological
and market driven job turnover in the absence of policy-induced adjustment costs. Under
the additional assumption that this technological and market driven demand for labor
reallocation carries over to other countries, we assess whether industries that require more
labor mobility are disproportionately aﬀected by regulations that raise adjustment costs.
The advantage, compared with standard cross-country/cross-industry empirical studies, is
that we exploit within country diﬀerences between industry/sizes based on the interaction
between country and industry/size characteristics. Thus, we can also control for country
and industry/size eﬀects, thereby minimizing the problems of omitted variable bias and
other misspeciﬁcations.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd support for the general hypothesis that hiring and ﬁring costs
reduce turnover, especially in those industries that require more frequent labor adjustment.
Regulations also distort the patterns of industry/size ﬂows. Within each industry, medium
1To our knowledge, the only other paper that econometrically analyzes the eﬀects of labor regulations
on gross job ﬂows across countries is Micco and Pages [2004]. Their paper exploits sectoral gross job ﬂows
data for manufacturing for 18 countries. We extend their work by also including the service industry for
a subset of countries and, more importantly, by controlling for industry speciﬁc diﬀerences in ﬁrm size.
In addition, our data allow distinguishing between jobs ﬂows generated by the entry and exit of ﬁrms
and those generated by the reallocation of labor by incumbent ﬁrms. As shown in the paper, this sheds
additional light on labor reallocation and the role of regulations in labor and product markets.
4and large ﬁrms are more severely aﬀected by stringent labor regulations, while small ﬁrms
are less aﬀected, probably because they are partially exempt from such regulations or can
more easily circumvent them. Moreover, stringent labor regulations have more of an impact
on job ﬂows for small and medium entering and exiting ﬁrms, as well as continuing ﬁrms of
all sizes, whereas product market regulations are more important for shaping the job ﬂows
of large entering and exiting ﬁrms, and do not play much of a role for continuing ﬁrms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our harmonized
ﬁrm-level dataset and discusses the diﬀerent concepts we have used to characterize labor
reallocation. Section 3 analyzes the main features of job ﬂows, highlighting the role of
ﬁrm dynamics, industry and size compositions. Section 4 presents the results from the
analysis of variance. Section 5 introduces the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach used in
the econometric analysis and discusses the empirical results for the baseline and policy
augmented speciﬁcations of the job ﬂow equations. It also describes a battery of robustness
tests. Finally, section 6 provides our concluding remarks.
2 Data
Our analysis of job ﬂows draws from a harmonized ﬁrm-level database that involves 16
industrial, developing and emerging economies (Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal,
the United Kingdom and the United States, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) and covers the 1990s (the time period covered varies
by country - see Table 1).2 The data collection was conducted by an active participation
of local experts in each of the countries, and involved the harmonization of key concepts
to the extent possible (such as entry and exit of ﬁrms, job creation and destruction, and
the unit of measurement), as well as the deﬁnition of common methods to compute the
indicators (see Bartelsman et al. [2005] for details).3
The key features of the micro-data underlying the analysis are as follows:
Unit of observation: Data used tend to conform to the following deﬁni-
tion:“an organizational unit producing goods or services which beneﬁts from a
2The database also includes Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan (China) as well as the Netherlands,
Canada, Denmark, Romania and Venezuela, but annual data on job ﬂows are not available for these
countries or are not fully reliable.
3Micco and Pages [2004] compiled a dataset from diﬀerent country sources covering 2-digit manufactur-
ing sector information for 18 countries. Their dataset does not include transition countries, and does not
allow diﬀerentiating job ﬂows by ﬁrm status and ﬁrm size for all the countries.
5certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of
its current resources” (EUROSTAT [1998]). Generally, this will be above the
establishment level.
Size threshold: While some registers include even single-person businesses
(ﬁrms without employees), others omit ﬁrms smaller than a certain size, usu-
ally in terms of the number of employees (businesses without employees), but
sometimes in terms of other measures such as sales (as is the case in the data
for France). Data used in this study exclude single-person businesses. However,
because smaller ﬁrms tend to have more volatile ﬁrm dynamics, remaining dif-
ferences in the threshold across diﬀerent country datasets should be taken into
account in the international comparison.
Industry coverage: Special eﬀorts have been made to organize the data
along a common industry classiﬁcation (ISIC Rev.3) that matches the OECD-
Structural database (STAN). In the panel datasets constructed to generate the
tabulations, ﬁrms were allocated to the single STAN industry that most closely
ﬁt their operations over the complete time-span.
The ﬁrm-level and job ﬂows data come from business registers (Finland, the United
Kingdom and the United States, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia), social security databases (Ger-
many, Italy, Mexico) or corporate tax rolls (Argentina, France, Hungary) (Table 1). Annual
industry surveys are generally not the best source for ﬁrm demographics, due to sampling
and reporting issues, but have been used nonetheless for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. Data
for Portugal are drawn from an employment-based register containing information on both
establishments and ﬁrms. All these databases allow ﬁrms and jobs to be tracked over time
because addition or removal of ﬁrms from the registers reﬂects the actual entry and exit of
ﬁrms.
6Table 1: Data Sources Used for Firm Demographics and Job Flows
Max. industry coverage
Country Source Period (number of industries) Threshold
OECD
Finland Business register 1988-1998 All (17) Emp ≥ 1
Turnover:
France Fiscal database 1989-1997 All (17) Man: Euro 0.58m
Serv: Euro 0.17m
Germany (West) Social security 1977-1999 All but civil service, Emp ≥ 1
self employed (11)
Italy Social security 1986-1994 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
Portugal Employment-based 1983-1998 All but public Emp ≥ 1
register administration (19)
United Kingdom Business register 1980-1998 Manufacturing (10) Emp ≥ 1
United States Business register 1988-1997 Private businesses (19) Emp ≥ 1
LAC
Argentina Register, based on Integrated 1995-2002 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
System of Pensions
Brazil Census 1996-2001 Manufacturing (13) Emp ≥ 1
Chile Annual Industry 1979-1999 Manufacturing (13) Emp. ≥ 10
Survey (ENIA)
Colombia Annual Manufacturing 1982-1998 Manufacturing (13) Emp. ≥ 10
Survey (EAM)
Mexico Social security 1985-2001 All (17) Emp ≥ 1
TRANSITION
Estonia Business register 1995-2001 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
Hungary Fiscal register (APEH) 1992-2001 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
Latvia Business register 1996-2002 All (18) Emp ≥ 1
Slovenia Business register 1992-2001 All (19) Emp ≥ 1
7Table 2: Job Flows indicators
















Net Employment Growth: netsic = possic − negsic
Job Reallocation Rate: sumsic = possic + negsic
Excess Job Reallocation Rate: excsic = possic − |negsic|
where i represents industry, s represents size class, c represents country, t represents time and E
denotes employment. Capital letters S and C refer to a set of size classes or countries,
respectively. The symbol ∆ denotes the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator, ∆Et = Et − Et−1. We take
averages of pos and neg, and then calculate net, sum and exc.
We deﬁne four size classes based on the number of ﬁrm employees: 1- 19 workers, 20-
49 workers, 50-99 workers, and 100 or more workers. In Table 2 we deﬁne the job creation
rate, job destruction rate, net employment growth, job reallocation rate, and excess job
reallocation rate (also by ﬁrm status: continuing, entering and exiting ﬁrms) (see also Davis
et al. [1996]).
3 Basic Facts about Job Turnover in Industrial and
Emerging Economies of Latin America and Central
and Eastern Europe
This section explores the main stylized facts emerging from our analysis across countries,
industries and ﬁrm size: 1) the large magnitude of job ﬂows in all countries, 2) the signiﬁcant
role that ﬁrm entry and exit play in total job ﬂows, 3) the diﬀerent job turnover across
ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes, and 4) the similarities in the industry ranking of job turnover across
countries. We review these stylized facts in turn below to motivate our multivariate analysis
aimed at assessing the possible role of labor market regulations for job turnover and the
magnitude and eﬃciency of the allocation of labor.
83.1 Large Job Turnover in All Countries
Table 3 presents summary statistics for job ﬂows across industry, size classes and countries,
for the total economy. Figure 1 summarizes country level job ﬂows and compares them
across countries.
Figure 1: Decomposition of Job Creation and Destruction by Continuing, Entering and
Exiting Firms, 1990s, Total Economy and Manufacturing
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
The ﬁrst noticeable fact emerging from this cross country comparison is the large
magnitude of job ﬂows in all countries. Gross job ﬂows (the sum of job creation and job
destruction) range from about 25 percent of total employment on average in the OECD
countries, to 29 percent in Latin American countries and to about 30 percent in the tran-
sition economies. By contrast, net employment changes were very modest if not nil in the
OECD and the Latin America samples, while the transition economies recorded a signiﬁ-
cant net job growth in the period covered by the data, after the substantial job losses of
the early phases of the transition.4
4see Geroski [1995] for a summary of the main stylized facts characterizing ﬁrm demographcs.
9Table 3: Average Job Flows in the 1990s, Overall and by Region, Total Economy
OVERALL
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Job Creation Rate 1048 0.147 0.067 0.000 0.647
Job Destruction Rate 1048 0.131 0.062 0.000 0.419
Net Employment Growth 1048 0.015 0.065 -0.299 0.419
Job Reallocation Rate 1048 0.278 0.112 0.000 0.875
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 1048 0.231 0.098 0.000 0.732
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 1048 0.055 0.043 0.000 0.357
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 1048 0.046 0.029 0.000 0.216
OECD
Job Creation Rate 448 0.127 0.046 0.033 0.288
Job Destruction Rate 448 0.127 0.060 0.029 0.411
Net Employment Growth 448 0.000 0.046 -0.282 0.148
Job Reallocation Rate 448 0.254 0.096 0.072 0.57
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 448 0.223 0.085 0.058 0.472
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 448 0.045 0.030 0.003 0.195
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 448 0.045 0.028 0.000 0.216
LAC
Job Creation Rate 300 0.148 0.061 0.033 0.431
Job Destruction Rate 300 0.140 0.066 0.041 0.419
Net Employment Growth 300 0.008 0.053 -0.214 0.286
Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.288 0.114 0.086 0.785
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.248 0.103 0.066 0.732
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 300 0.056 0.040 0.000 0.227
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 300 0.053 0.032 0.003 0.152
TRANSITION
Job Creation Rate 300 0.174 0.088 0.000 0.647
Job Destruction Rate 300 0.128 0.061 0.000 0.385
Net Employment Growth 300 0.046 0.087 -0.299 0.419
Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.303 0.123 0.000 0.875
Excess Job Reallocation Rate 300 0.227 0.109 0.000 0.608
Job Creation Rate (Entry) 300 0.070 0.056 0.000 0.357
Job Destruction Rate (Exit) 300 0.039 0.025 0.000 0.135
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
3.2 Firm Dynamics Play a Major Role in Total Job Flows
The second main stylized fact emerging from our analysis of job ﬂows is the strong con-
tribution of the creative destruction process. Indeed, entering and exiting ﬁrms account
10for about 30-40 percent of total job ﬂows. Within the OECD sample, the entry of new
ﬁrms played a particularly strong role in total job creation in Finland in the 1990s (46
and 51 percent of total job creation in total economy and manufacturing, respectively),
Slovenia (42 and 46 percent of total job creation) and Portugal (41 and 38 percent of total
job creation). At the same time, the exit of obsolete ﬁrms also accounted for a signiﬁcant
fraction of overall job destruction, particularly so in Argentina (42 and 38 percent of total
job destruction), Finland (39 and 41 percent of total job destruction) and Portugal (38 and
40 percent of total job destruction). In transition countries, entry was more important in
the early years of transition and exit in the second half of the 1990s, both for the total
economy and in manufacturing.5
The large job ﬂows in the transition countries are not surprising. The process of
transition started in the early 1990s and it included downsizing or exit of existing ﬁrms
as well as the entry of new ﬁrms as the economies progressed towards a market economy.
Indeed, entering ﬁrms created 40.2 percent of jobs in transition countries, compared to 35.4
percent in the OECD countries. In addition, job destruction due to exit represented 35.4
percent of total job destruction in the OECD countries, but only 30.5 percent in transition
countries. Findings are similar if we focus only on industries within manufacturing.
3.3 Small and Large Firms Contribute the Most to Job Flows
Small ﬁrms account for the vast majority of total ﬁrm dynamics in all countries in our
sample. However, their contribution to overall job reallocation, while still important, is
less dominant. Figure 2 presents job reallocation rates by ﬁrm size classes. In general, job
reallocation is highest in ﬁrms with less than 20 employees, and the lowest in ﬁrms with
100+ employees. In the United States, job turnover declines monotonically with ﬁrm size,
and the decline is particularly marked among large units (100+). Latin American countries
follow similar patterns to those of the United States, while the European countries, with
the exception of France, have a less marked drop of job reallocation among larger units.
The transition countries, on the other hand, show a steeper slope in smaller size classes,
especially in the early years of transition.
The analysis of size speciﬁc job reallocation rates should be complemented with a de-
composition of the overall job reallocation into that due to ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Tables 4
and 5 present the percentage of job creation/destruction/reallocation in each size class as a
5This was especially so in Slovenia, a lot of entry occurred in the early 1990s, since private ﬁrms were few
and far in between prior to that; exit did not keep up with that early on and was relatively low compared
to OECD and other transition countries.






where i denotes industry, s denotes size class and c denotes country. X stands for POS,
NEG or SUM, where POS is the number of jobs created, NEG the number of jobs
destroyed and SUM the total number of jobs reallocated (created+destroyed).6
Figure 2: Job Reallocation across Firms of Diﬀerent Sizes, Total Economy
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
In manufacturing, the highest share of jobs was created/destroyed/reallocated by
ﬁrms in the largest size class: 100+. At the same time, however, the second most important
size class in terms of job reallocation is ﬁrms with less than 20 employees. In fact, it seems
that the number of jobs created/destroyed/reallocated has a U-shaped relationship with
6Note that for Chile, Colombia and France, we do not observe some of the smallest ﬁrms (in the ﬁrst
two countries, we do not observe ﬁrms with less than 10 workers, and for France, ﬁrms with sales below a
certain threshold are excluded from the sample).
12size class in manufacturing. The importance of the smallest size class increased in transition
countries over time, and the importance of the largest size class decreased.
At the level of total economy, the highest share of jobs was created/destroyed/-
reallocated in the smallest size class in a number of countries (Germany, Italy, Portugal,
Argentina, Estonia, Latvia), followed by the largest size class. Again, a similar pattern is
observed for transition countries: the smallest size class gained in importance over time,
while the largest size class declined in importance.
3.4 Large Disparities in Job Flows Across Industries
To assess the possible role of policy and institutions in shaping the magnitude and eﬀec-
tiveness of job ﬂows, we need to identify the intrinsic need for job mobility that certain
industries may have compared to others. Certain industries are exposed to greater vari-
ability in demand; may be more exposed to macro shocks; and may be facing a higher pace
of technological progress that imposes more frequent retooling of the production process
and the associated adjustment of the workforce.
To illustrate the cross-industry variation in job ﬂows, we highlight the U.S. industries
with the highest (wood) and the lowest (transport equipment) job ﬂows within manufactur-
ing, as well as the trade and restaurants sector (see Table 6). In wood, the job reallocation
rate was 26 percent in the United States, and ranged from only 13 percent in Germany to 37
percent in Brazil. In the United States, incumbent ﬁrms were responsible for more than 70
percent of job reallocation, whereas in Great Britain, 53 percent of reallocation was due to
entry and exit of ﬁrms. In transport equipment, the job reallocation rate was 11.9 percent
in the United States, and ranged from 8.3 percent in Germany to 34 percent in Latvia.
In Mexico, incumbent ﬁrms were responsible for more than 85 percent of job reallocation,
whereas in Slovenia, almost 53 percent of reallocation was due to entry and exit of ﬁrms.
In trade and restaurants, job reallocation ranged from 22.2 percent in Slovenia after 1996
to 38.8 percent in France. In all countries, reallocation in this industry was mostly due to
incumbent ﬁrms, but this share diﬀers among countries.
13Table 4: Percentage of Job Flows in a Certain Size Class, Total Economy, 1990s
Gross Job Reallocation Job Creation Job Destruction
Country <20 20-49 50-99 100+ <20 20-49 50-99 100+ <20 20-49 50-99 100+
Germany 0.467 0.140 0.093 0.300 0.440 0.149 0.102 0.309 0.51 0.129 0.082 0.278
Finland 0.394 0.103 0.067 0.436 0.419 0.088 0.055 0.438 0.369 0.12 0.080 0.431
France 0.173 0.133 0.110 0.584 0.130 0.085 0.103 0.682 0.220 0.185 0.119 0.477
Italy 0.522 0.130 0.073 0.276 0.492 0.142 0.085 0.280 0.568 0.116 0.059 0.256
Portugal 0.457 0.153 0.097 0.292 0.471 0.152 0.094 0.283 0.449 0.152 0.099 0.300
United States 0.315 0.131 0.087 0.467 0.279 0.132 0.089 0.499 0.361 0.130 0.085 0.423
Argentina 0.397 0.154 0.106 0.342 0.367 0.158 0.112 0.362 0.433 0.147 0.097 0.322
Mexico 0.377 0.137 0.099 0.386 0.319 0.137 0.103 0.442 0.462 0.138 0.094 0.307
Estonia (1990s) 0.365 0.172 0.125 0.337 0.414 0.167 0.114 0.306 0.318 0.180 0.139 0.363
Hungary (1990s) 0.273 0.134 0.118 0.475 0.296 0.144 0.107 0.453 0.251 0.125 0.127 0.497
Latvia (1990s) 0.383 0.141 0.104 0.371 0.390 0.137 0.101 0.372 0.376 0.150 0.112 0.363
Slovenia (1990s) 0.227 0.088 0.100 0.585 0.293 0.100 0.090 0.517 0.169 0.076 0.112 0.643
Estonia (late 1990s) 0.365 0.172 0.125 0.337 0.414 0.167 0.114 0.306 0.318 0.180 0.139 0.363
Hungary (late 1990s) 0.317 0.142 0.108 0.433 0.337 0.149 0.106 0.408 0.294 0.132 0.111 0.463
Latvia (late 1990s) 0.421 0.143 0.107 0.328 0.437 0.139 0.107 0.317 0.398 0.150 0.109 0.343
Slovenia (late 1990s) 0.287 0.104 0.099 0.510 0.328 0.121 0.084 0.467 0.244 0.085 0.116 0.555
We do not observe ﬁrms with sales below a given threshold in France.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
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4Table 5: Percentage of Job Flows in a Certain Size Class, Manufacturing, 1990s
Gross Job Reallocation Job Creation Job Destruction
Country <20 20-49 50-99 100+ <20 20-49 50-99 100+ <20 20-49 50-99 100+
Germany 0.344 0.136 0.098 0.422 0.307 0.141 0.110 0.442 0.399 0.135 0.088 0.378
Finland 0.199 0.093 0.073 0.635 0.205 0.088 0.065 0.642 0.201 0.099 0.083 0.618
France 0.258 0.156 0.109 0.477 0.227 0.139 0.105 0.530 0.286 0.175 0.113 0.426
United Kingdom 0.198 0.116 0.102 0.583 0.209 0.116 0.103 0.572 0.183 0.113 0.101 0.604
Italy 0.427 0.142 0.078 0.353 0.421 0.154 0.082 0.343 0.445 0.133 0.074 0.348
Portugal 0.306 0.193 0.137 0.364 0.335 0.197 0.132 0.337 0.289 0.186 0.138 0.386
United States 0.161 0.116 0.096 0.626 0.146 0.119 0.099 0.635 0.180 0.114 0.094 0.612
Argentina 0.331 0.164 0.115 0.389 0.318 0.174 0.123 0.385 0.346 0.155 0.108 0.392
Brazil 0.288 0.145 0.100 0.466 0.290 0.162 0.105 0.443 0.297 0.127 0.092 0.484
Chile 0.069 0.163 0.158 0.610 0.051 0.154 0.154 0.640 0.091 0.174 0.163 0.572
Colombia 0.126 0.172 0.163 0.538 0.095 0.160 0.161 0.585 0.162 0.186 0.165 0.487
Mexico 0.258 0.124 0.103 0.515 0.201 0.115 0.100 0.584 0.343 0.137 0.106 0.414
Estonia (1990s) 0.227 0.172 0.142 0.459 0.246 0.180 0.146 0.429 0.206 0.164 0.137 0.493
Hungary (1990s) 0.159 0.121 0.111 0.609 0.165 0.135 0.117 0.583 0.154 0.107 0.106 0.633
Latvia (1990s) 0.431 0.155 0.110 0.305 0.451 0.157 0.120 0.272 0.400 0.154 0.092 0.354
Slovenia (1990s) 0.100 0.072 0.100 0.728 0.146 0.091 0.102 0.661 0.069 0.058 0.102 0.771
Estonia (late 1990s) 0.227 0.172 0.142 0.459 0.246 0.180 0.146 0.429 0.206 0.164 0.137 0.493
Hungary (late 1990s) 0.172 0.128 0.109 0.591 0.177 0.136 0.111 0.576 0.169 0.119 0.108 0.604
Latvia (late 1990s) 0.453 0.146 0.107 0.293 0.467 0.147 0.120 0.265 0.434 0.146 0.085 0.336
Slovenia (late 1990s) 0.128 0.082 0.108 0.682 0.173 0.112 0.106 0.609 0.099 0.062 0.11 0.729
We do not observe ﬁrms with less than 10 workers in Chile and Colombia, and ﬁrms with sales below a given threshold
are excluded from the sample in France.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
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5Table 6: Cross-Industry Variation in Job Flows
HIGH - WOOD LOW - TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT TRADE AND RESTAURANT
Gross Job Entry & Gross Job Entry & Gross Job Entry &
Country Reallocation Continuers Exit Reallocation Continuers Exit Reallocation Continuers Exit
EU & USA
Germany 0.130 0.105 0.027 0.083 0.071 0.012
Finland 0.252 0.156 0.096 0.249 0.135 0.113 0.264 0.158 0.106
France 0.248 0.146 0.102 0.238 0.174 0.064 0.388 0.305 0.083
United Kingdom 0.289 0.132 0.154 0.199 0.109 0.089
Italy 0.215 0.141 0.074 0.125 0.091 0.034 0.259 0.161 0.098
Portugal 0.226 0.121 0.105 0.197 0.135 0.061 0.260 0.146 0.114
United States 0.260 0.185 0.074 0.119 0.108 0.010 0.256 0.176 0.080
LAC
Argentina 0.224 0.134 0.090 0.197 0.156 0.041 0.271 0.151 0.121
Brazil 0.370 0.236 0.134 0.228 0.162 0.066
Chile 0.287 0.151 0.136 0.272 0.163 0.109
Colombia 0.223 0.133 0.090 0.187 0.135 0.052
Mexico 0.346 0.228 0.118 0.234 0.200 0.033 0.311 0.182 0.129
TRANSITION, 1990s
Estonia 0.242 0.140 0.102 0.166 0.117 0.050 0.295 0.194 0.101
Hungary 0.290 0.176 0.114 0.244 0.186 0.058 0.375 0.238 0.137
Latvia 0.292 0.219 0.074 0.330 0.243 0.087 0.298 0.222 0.076
Slovenia 0.191 0.119 0.072 0.252 0.118 0.133 0.263 0.161 0.103
TRANSITION, late 1990s
Estonia 0.242 0.140 0.102 0.166 0.117 0.050 0.295 0.194 0.101
Hungary 0.262 0.159 0.102 0.259 0.193 0.065 0.338 0.211 0.127
Latvia 0.266 0.192 0.074 0.348 0.280 0.068 0.277 0.208 0.070
Slovenia 0.165 0.109 0.056 0.194 0.107 0.087 0.222 0.146 0.076
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
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63.5 The Correlation of Industry/Size Job Flows Across Countries
We next look at the correlation of industry/size level job ﬂows across countries. A strong
inﬂuence of market-driven and technological factors in shaping industry job ﬂows should
result in a strong correlation across countries. However, as we will see below and as stressed
in previous studies (e.g. see Micco and Pages [2004]), industry/size job ﬂows are also inﬂu-
enced by the policy and institutional environment. Lack of correlation may not therefore
imply that market-driven and technological factors do not play a signiﬁcant role, but rather
that policy and institutions distort job ﬂows. Job ﬂows are part-and-parcel of the creative
destruction process, and an unfavourable institutional environment will cause this process
to stagnate (Caballero and Hammour [2000a]). To minimize the possible interference of
the policy environment, we also present the rank correlation of industry job ﬂows, which
may provide a better proxy for the true correlation if the policy environment aﬀects levels
but not the rank order of industry/size ﬂows.
Table 7 presents the industry/size pairwise level correlations, using the United States
as the benchmark, for several ﬂow indicators: gross job reallocation, excess job realloca-
tion, job creation by entering ﬁrms and job destruction by exiting ﬁrms. We use two-digit
industry and four size classes. It is noticeable that the cross-country correlations are very
high for most countries. Focusing on gross job reallocation, the correlation between the
EU average and the United States is 0.71; that between Latin American countries and the
United States is 0.83 and that for transition countries is 0.71. Rank correlations (Table 8)
are slightly lower than levels correlations for some Latin American countries and higher for
the others, but are on average still the highest among regions. Correlations are on average
higher if we focus only on manufacturing (not reported here). Industry/size-level correla-
tions with the U.S. are particularly strong for some Latin American countries, e.g. Brazil
(0.90) and Colombia (0.91), despite the very diﬀerent degree of economic development, as
well as for Great Britain (0.84). Some of the lowest correlations are found for some EU
countries, in particular France (0.47).7
7We cannot compare the reported results directly with Micco and Pages [2004], since our analysis
includes the size dimension in addition to the industry dimension. However, we also conducted the analysis
excluding the size dimension (not reported here, but available upon request from the authors), and we ﬁnd
that the pairwise correlation with U.S. gross job reallocation is highest for Mexico (0.91), followed by Brazil
(0.84) and Great Britain (0.74). They ﬁnd the correlation to be the highest with Canada, Great Britain
and New Zealand, but our sample covers diﬀerent time-periods.
17Table 7: Pairwise Correlations with the U.S. Job Flows, Total Economy (Unbalanced Panel)
Gross Job Excess Job Job Creation by Job Destruction by
Reallocation Reallocation Entering Firms Exiting Firms
OECD 0.7057 0.6577 0.5851 0.6900
Germany 0.8183 0.8074 0.7815 0.8525
Finland 0.6852 0.6025 0.0509 0.4277
France 0.4745 0.3531 0.5845 0.7815
United Kingdom 0.8471 0.8247 0.7129 0.7737
Italy 0.5954 0.5782 0.5504 0.7031
Portugal 0.8134 0.7804 0.8301 0.6012
LAC 0.8290 0.7773 0.7848 0.8024
Argentina 0.7670 0.7214 0.7851 0.7527
Brazil 0.9048 0.8383 0.9035 0.7768
Chile 0.7264 0.5556 0.6013 0.7632
Colombia 0.9121 0.8835 0.8780 0.8534
Mexico 0.8345 0.8878 0.7562 0.8660
TRANSITION, 1990s 0.7057 0.6961 0.623 0.4413
Estonia 0.6036 0.6554 0.4761 0.1641
Hungary 0.8168 0.8157 0.8174 0.6911
Latvia 0.6616 0.6962 0.5919 0.5960
Slovenia 0.7406 0.6172 0.6065 0.3140
Late 1990s 0.6771 0.6981 0.5859 0.4500
Estonia 0.6036 0.6554 0.4761 0.1641
Hungary 0.7911 0.7970 0.8070 0.6622
Latvia 0.5919 0.6644 0.5886 0.6108
Slovenia 0.7216 0.6755 0.4718 0.3629
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
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8Table 8: Rank Correlations with the U.S. Job Flows, Total Economy (Unbalanced Panel)
Gross Job Excess Job Job Creation by Job Destruction by
Reallocation Reallocation Entering Firms Exiting Firms
OECD 0.7007 0.6330 0.5445 0.7030
Germany 0.8186 0.8154 0.7950 0.8789
Finland 0.6450 0.5269 -0.0089 0.5028
France 0.5083 0.3688 0.5654 0.7423
United Kingdom 0.8672 0.7937 0.6713 0.8168
Italy 0.5880 0.5515 0.5443 0.5999
Portugal 0.7770 0.7418 0.6996 0.6773
LAC 0.8371 0.7908 0.8035 0.8121
Argentina 0.8611 0.8255 0.7897 0.7774
Brazil 0.8868 0.7913 0.8956 0.7828
Chile 0.6743 0.5619 0.6358 0.7608
Colombia 0.8996 0.8812 0.8624 0.8586
Mexico 0.8636 0.8940 0.8342 0.8810
TRANSITION, 1990s 0.7174 0.6978 0.6240 0.4702
Estonia 0.6785 0.6186 0.5161 0.2981
Hungary 0.8200 0.8108 0.7676 0.7223
Latvia 0.6304 0.7137 0.5481 0.5560
Slovenia 0.7407 0.6479 0.6640 0.3045
Late 1990s 0.6925 0.6874 0.5832 0.4807
Estonia 0.6785 0.6186 0.5161 0.2981
Hungary 0.7925 0.7711 0.7529 0.6955
Latvia 0.5854 0.6671 0.5945 0.5792
Slovenia 0.7136 0.6927 0.4691 0.3498
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
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9It is also interesting to see that transition economies had a much stronger correlation
of their job ﬂow pattern by industry and size class with the United States in the sample
that covers the entire 1990s than in the sample focusing on the 1996-2001 period. This
could be surprising, since the early phases of the transition were characterized by massive
job reallocation and the unique need to change the structure of the economy. One working
hypothesis that we develop later in the paper is that after the initial phases of transition,
these countries have moved towards the ﬂow patterns observed in EU countries, with whom
they share several policy and institutional factors.
4 Analysis of Variance
In the previous section, we explored the diﬀerent dimensions of the job ﬂow data across
countries, industries and size classes. The next logical step is to assess the relative im-
portance of these diﬀerent dimensions in explaining the overall variance in our dataset.
Tables 9 and 10 present the analysis of variance of job ﬂows, for the unbalanced total econ-
omy8 and manufacturing samples, respectively. We consider industry, size, country and
industry*size eﬀects separately, and, in addition, diﬀerentiate the analysis of variance by
region (OECD, transition, Latin America).
It is noticeable that technological and market structure characteristics that are re-
ﬂected in the industry-speciﬁc eﬀects explain only 6.8 percent of variation in overall cross-
country gross job reallocation (Table 9), although they account for a higher share in Latin
America (23.3 percent). By contrast, diﬀerences in the size structure of ﬁrms explain as
much as 40.0 percent of the total variation in cross-country gross job reallocation in all
regions, and play an even more important role in transition countries at the beginning of
the 1990s. This fact is again in accordance with the characteristics of transition, as already
mentioned in the previous section. Even country eﬀects explain more of the variation in
gross job reallocation than the industry eﬀects, except in Latin America, so even though
there are similarities among countries within a region, there is still variation between them.
Overall, the combined industry*size eﬀects can explain the bulk of the variation in gross job
reallocation: 55.6 percent overall, 55.8 percent in OECD countries, 73.3 percent in Latin
American countries and 72.3 percent in transition countries (66.9 percent, if we look only
at the second half of the 1990s).
Gross job reallocation consists of job creation and job destruction, so we now turn
8The total economy sample is unbalanced in the sense that it covers manufacturing only for United
Kingdom, Brazil, Chile and Colombia - see Table 1 for details.
20to these two categories of job ﬂows for further insight. We also further distinguish job
creation by new ﬁrms and by incumbents and job destruction by exiting ﬁrms and by those
that survive but downsize (we report only the results for job creation by new ﬁrms and job
destruction by exiting ﬁrms; other results are available upon request from the authors). A
number of interesting features emerge:
• Industry eﬀects. These explain about 6.7 percent of variation in job creation and 6.1
percent of variation in job destruction, but there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences among
the three regions. Industry eﬀects account for a much larger share of the overall
variation (30.8 percent) in job creation in Latin America, slightly less than half of
this in OECD countries, and only 7.3 percent in transition countries. In the early
phases of transition, creation of jobs occurred across all industries, whereas they were
more concentrated in certain industries in OECD countries and especially in Latin
America: 14.4 percent of the variation in job destruction in Latin America can be
explained by industry eﬀects, but only 8.9 percent in OECD countries.
• Size eﬀects. Both in the case of job creation and job destruction, size eﬀects alone
account for a signiﬁcant share of the total variation (30.0 and 41.0 percent, respec-
tively). Looking at results by region reveals that size eﬀects can account for 54.0
percent of variation in job creation in transition countries, but only 28.6 percent of
variation in job destruction. In Latin America, the results are the opposite: size
eﬀects can account for 63.0 percent of variation in job destruction, but only for 21.4
percent of job creation.
• The role of entry and exit of ﬁrms. Size heterogeneity plays a particularly strong
role in explaining the variation of job creation by new ﬁrms and job destruction by
exiting ﬁrms. Size heterogeneity is particularly important in Latin America, where it
accounts for 59.5 percent of the heterogeneity in job creation by new ﬁrms and 70.0
percent of the variation in job destruction by exiting ﬁrms. In the OECD countries,
size heterogeneity plays a smaller role in both job creation and destruction by entering
and exiting ﬁrms. In the transition economies there is a strong diﬀerence between
job creation and destruction. The variation of job creation by entrants is strongly
inﬂuenced by size heterogeneity, while the importance of size eﬀects for variation in
job destruction by exiters is relatively small.
How should one interpret these diﬀerent sources of variability of job ﬂows? Not
surprisingly, in all regions size heterogeneity looms large among new ﬁrms depending on
market conditions, but also upon regulations that may aﬀect the optimal size of entry.
This seems particularly the case in Latin America where industries with many new micro
entrants coexist with those where entry size is larger. But size heterogeneity also explains
a signiﬁcant fraction of the variance in job destruction due to ﬁrm exit: in some industries,
21small young businesses often fail, while in others, more mature large ﬁrms tend to decline.
By contrast, in transition economies there is more variability in the size structure of new
ﬁrms than among those that exit the market. A large number of new businesses entered the
market, ﬁlling diﬀerent niches of activities that were largely underdeveloped under central
planning, while job destruction occurred more evenly in ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes; many
large obsolete ﬁrms closed, but so did many relatively small new ventures. In transition
economies, country eﬀects account for 20.3 percent of the variation in job destruction by
exiting ﬁrms, but only 6.5 percent of the variation in job creation by entering ﬁrms. This
is suggestive of cross-country diﬀerences in the enterprise restructuring and its impact on
ﬁrm closure and downsizing.9
To summarize, the analysis of variance of job ﬂows suggests a signiﬁcant role for
the size composition - a factor that was not considered in previous studies - as well as
diﬀerences across and within regions. Technological and market structure characteristics
(e.g. the industry eﬀects) seem to play a relatively smaller role in explaining cross-country
diﬀerences in job ﬂows.
9See Haltiwanger and Vodopivec [2003] and World Bank [2004].
22Table 9: Analysis of Variance, Total Economy (Unbalanced Panel)
Job Job Net Employment Gross Job Excess Job Job Creation Job Destruction
Creation Destruction Growth Reallocation Reallocation - Entry - Exit
INDUSTRY EFFECTS
All 0.0670 0.0613 0.0554 0.0675 0.0538 0.0164 0.0500
OECD 0.1492 0.0892 0.1164 0.1104 0.0509 0.0229 0.0706
LAC 0.3076 0.1438 0.1568 0.2327 0.1655 0.1159 0.1049
Transition (1990s) 0.0644 0.0931 0.1525 0.0341 0.0877 0.0486 0.0938
Transition (late 1990s) 0.0731 0.0665 0.1350 0.0344 0.0790 0.0399 0.0827
SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.3003 0.4100 0.0021 0.4706 0.4591 0.4325 0.3373
OECD 0.3027 0.3738 0.0605 0.4139 0.4468 0.4439 0.3127
LAC 0.2142 0.6300 0.2557 0.4777 0.5093 0.5950 0.7000
Transition (1990s) 0.5400 0.2861 0.1443 0.6149 0.4706 0.4858 0.1236
Transition (late 1990s) 0.4309 0.2488 0.0708 0.5268 0.4945 0.4412 0.1441
COUNTRY EFFECTS
All 0.2138 0.1252 0.1975 0.1648 0.1435 0.1453 0.1996
OECD 0.1576 0.2009 0.1113 0.2019 0.1885 0.1253 0.2829
LAC 0.3041 0.0419 0.1808 0.1588 0.1276 0.1133 0.0255
Transition (1990s) 0.0570 0.0867 0.0974 0.0512 0.0865 0.0653 0.2031
Transition (late 1990s) 0.0997 0.0445 0.0681 0.0851 0.0933 0.0645 0.1719
INDUSTRY*SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.3861 0.4964 0.0904 0.5558 0.5263 0.4624 0.4097
OECD 0.4888 0.5041 0.2421 0.5579 0.5215 0.5018 0.4053
LAC 0.5574 0.8079 0.5062 0.7326 0.6998 0.7364 0.8478
Transition (1990s) 0.6856 0.4685 0.3998 0.7233 0.6186 0.5956 0.3004
Transition (late 1990s) 0.5978 0.4736 0.3417 0.6692 0.6493 0.5676 0.3189
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
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3Table 10: Analysis of Variance, Manufacturing
Job Job Net Employment Gross Job Excess Job Job Creation Job Destruction
Creation Destruction Growth Reallocation Reallocation - Entry - Exit
INDUSTRY EFFECTS
All 0.0126 0.0432 0.0431 0.0207 0.0129 0.0093 0.0484
OECD 0.0377 0.0681 0.1729 0.0358 0.0136 0.0135 0.0691
LAC 0.0397 0.0429 0.0626 0.0371 0.0172 0.0196 0.0464
Transition (1990s) 0.0344 0.072 0.0902 0.0257 0.0577 0.0402 0.0655
Transition (late 1990s) 0.0387 0.0469 0.0695 0.0251 0.0529 0.0244 0.0666
SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.3307 0.4572 0.0046 0.5231 0.4903 0.4120 0.3555
OECD 0.4202 0.4786 0.0727 0.5254 0.5053 0.4083 0.3252
LAC 0.3112 0.6997 0.2919 0.5946 0.5737 0.6780 0.7441
Transition (1990s) 0.5315 0.2608 0.1302 0.5940 0.4678 0.4327 0.1031
Transition (late 1990s) 0.4188 0.2257 0.0660 0.5116 0.5086 0.3937 0.1217
COUNTRY EFFECTS
All 0.2627 0.1217 0.2310 0.1868 0.1783 0.1620 0.2351
OECD 0.1937 0.1710 0.0757 0.1981 0.2164 0.1680 0.3753
LAC 0.454 0.0538 0.2244 0.2157 0.1874 0.1446 0.0388
Transition (1990s) 0.0458 0.1033 0.0947 0.0508 0.1062 0.0589 0.2157
Transition (late 1990s) 0.1113 0.0449 0.0999 0.0761 0.1112 0.0608 0.1919
INDUSTRY*SIZE EFFECTS
All 0.3649 0.5265 0.0811 0.5641 0.5171 0.4371 0.4274
OECD 0.4862 0.5894 0.3134 0.5930 0.5408 0.4505 0.4171
LAC 0.3724 0.7695 0.4003 0.6519 0.6081 0.7143 0.8235
Transition (1990s) 0.6548 0.4303 0.3295 0.7029 0.5831 0.5407 0.2536
Transition (late 1990s) 0.5563 0.4489 0.2741 0.6605 0.6390 0.5214 0.2797




In this section, we develop an empirical analysis of the determinants of the observed dif-
ferences in job ﬂows across countries, industries and size classes. We base our empirical
analysis on two important results discussed in the previous sections: 1) a signiﬁcant share
of the total variance in job ﬂows observed in the data is explained by industry*size ef-
fects, and 2) there is a high correlation of industry/size job ﬂows across countries. These
two results are consistent with the hypothesis that the distribution of idiosyncratic proﬁt
shocks aﬀecting desired employment and the costs that inﬂuence the adjustment to such
shocks varies systematically by industry and size class. For example, demand character-
istics in some industries imply that ﬁrms face higher volatility in their product demand
than other industries. Likewise, technological characteristics may require more frequent
re-tooling of the production process with associated need to adjust the workforce. Alter-
natively, certain technological characteristics may require ﬁrms to use highly specialized
workers and thus make them less likely to adjust frequently their workforce to respond to
idiosyncratic shocks. Demand and technological characteristics also aﬀect the composition
of ﬁrms within each industry and their response to shocks. For example, some industries
are characterized by the presence of small ﬁrms which tend to be more volatile than large
businesses in all countries.
Adjustment costs governing responses to idiosyncratic shocks vary not only by indus-
try and size, due to underlying market and technological factors, but also across countries,
due to diﬀerences in institutions. To the extent that institutions vary more by country
than industry and size, our working hypothesis is that the impact of institutions that im-
pede adjustment in any given country will be more binding on industry/size cells with the
greatest propensity for reallocation in that country. The amount of churning in a particular
sector hence depends on the distribution of productivity shocks (z) and adjustment costs.
A simple (S,s) model with ﬁxed costs of adjustment can be used to illustrate the
logic behind our argument. First, consider two sectors, 1 and 2, where sector 2 has a higher
variance of productivity shocks and both sectors have the same thresholds of adjustment,
z◦1 = z◦2 and z◦
1 = z◦
2, as illustrated in Panel A of Figure 3 where F1 (z) and F2 (z)
represent the probability density function of productivity shocks. Sector with a higher
variance of productivity shocks has a larger fraction of ﬁrms in the tails - the range of
activity where the ﬁrms adjust to the new conditions. Hence, as our working hypothesis
suggests, more volatile sectors are more sensitive to regulations or institutional factors that
25raise adjustment costs for ﬁrms, since they have a higher fraction of ﬁrms in the range of
activity.
Second, Panel B of Figure 3 considers the case of two sectors with the same variance
of productivity shocks; however sector 2 has higher adjustment costs and hence a wider
range of inactivity (which is illustrated by z◦2 < z◦1 and z◦
2 > z◦
1). If adjustment costs
in a country increase for both sectors because of more stringent regulations - for example,
stricter employment protection legislation - the thresholds will be pushed to z◦1∗ < z◦1,
z◦
1∗ < z◦
1, z◦2∗ < z◦2 and z◦
1∗ < z◦
1. Sectors with originally lower adjustment costs will be
more adversely aﬀected, since increase in adjustment costs will push a higher fraction of
ﬁrms from the range of adjustment (reallocation) to the range of inactivity (no reallocation).
5.2 The Estimation Model
We explore the links between the regulatory environment in which ﬁrms operate and
job turnover by exploiting the observed industry/size variations through a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence approach (see Rajan and Zingales [1998]).10 The test is constructed as follows:
we identify an industry/size propensity for job reallocation from the United States data.
Under the assumption that regulations in the labor and goods markets in the United States
are among the least restrictive in our sample, variation in job reallocation across indus-
try/size cells in the United States should proxy for the technological and market driven
diﬀerences in job reallocation in the absence of policy induced adjustment costs. Under the
additional assumption that these technological and market driven diﬀerences in the demand
for job reallocation carry over to other countries, we assess whether industry/size cells that
have a greater propensity for job reallocation are disproportionally aﬀected by regulations
that raise adjustment costs. This would imply that, ceteris paribus, industry/size cells with
more volatile idiosyncratic proﬁt shocks and more frequent adjustment of factors should be
more strongly aﬀected by regulations raising adjustment costs than those industry/size cells
with less volatile idiosyncratic proﬁt shocks and less frequent adjustment. The advantage of
our approach compared to standard cross-country/cross-industry empirical studies is that
we exploit within country diﬀerences between industry/size cells based on the interaction
between country and industry/size characteristics. Thus, we can also control for country
and industry/size eﬀects, thereby minimizing problems of omitted variable bias and other
misspeciﬁcations.
10The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach has already been used in the corporate literature (e.g., Classens
and Laeven [2003]), in the analysis of ﬁrm dynamics (Klapper et al. [2004]) and in the analysis of job ﬂows
(Micco and Pages [2004]).
26Figure 3: Distribution of productivity shocks and ﬁxed adjustment costs - two-sector case
27Our diﬀerent model speciﬁcations used in the empirical analysis can be summarized
as follows:
i) baseline speciﬁcation
JFlowsic = β0 + β1USJFlowsi +
C X
c=1
γcDc + sic (2)
where Dc are country c (c = 1,...,C) dummies, USJflowsi is the U.S. job ﬂow variable
in size class s and industry i, and  is the iid error term. This speciﬁcation will give
us a sense about the link between cross industry/size diﬀerences in gross job ﬂows
between the United States and other countries in our sample.
ii) cross-sectional analysis of regulation
JFlowsic = β0 + β1USJFlowsi + β2Regulationc +
M X
m=1
δmDm + sic (3)
We have now added a regulatory variable that only varies across countries and thus
requires removing the country dummies. To partially control for the omitted ﬁxed
eﬀect, we can introduce regional dummies (Dm,m = 1,...,M), although we have
shown before that there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity within each region.
iii) diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence with interaction





Here we examine whether the diﬀerence in industry/size job ﬂows between high and
low volatility industry/size cells is smaller in highly regulated countries compared to
the U.S. benchmark. By including the regulatory variable only in interaction with the
U.S. job ﬂow measure, we can control for unobserved country ﬁxed eﬀects.
The multivariate version of this speciﬁcation, in which we consider more than one
28regulatory variable together, can be written as follows:








where k = 1,...,K is the number of regulatory variables used.
The measure of job ﬂows used in the empirical analysis is the sum of job creation
and job destruction rates (sum). In Appendix B, we also report the same speciﬁcations
discussed above for excess job reallocation, that is, the diﬀerence between the sum and
the (absolute value of) net employment change. As shown in Appendix B, the results are
largely unaﬀected by the use of this alternative measure of job ﬂows.
All our variables are time averages over the available annual observations. The sample
is unbalanced and covers fewer years for some countries than others (see Table 1). Time
averaging allows us to reduce the possible impact of business cycle ﬂuctuations in the years
for which we have the data and the possibility that such ﬂuctuations were not synchronized
(and thus could be captured by common time dummies). We also consider two sample
periods: 1) 1989 to 2001, and 2) the same sample for OECD and Latin American countries
and the sample from 1996 onwards for the transition economies. The choice of the second
sub-sample for the transition economies is motivated by two interrelated factors. First and
as discussed in the previous section, the initial years of the transition process (1991 to 1995)
were characterized by unprecedented reallocation of labor - and other factors of production
- across industries, ﬁrms and locations. The magnitude and direction of the observed ﬂows
were only temporary and, indeed, job ﬂows declined towards the standard of the OECD
countries, and also became more balanced within each industry/size cell. Second, the early
years of transition were characterized by major regulatory reforms to conform countries’
institutional settings to those of market economies. For these two reasons, focusing on the
second half of the 1990s for the transition economies is more appropriate in our comparative
analysis of job ﬂows.
5.3 Regulations in Labor and Product Markets
Before moving into the analysis of the empirical results, we brieﬂy discuss our regulatory
indicators. We consider synthetic indicators of the stringency of regulations in the labor
and product markets, as well as the degree of enforcement of laws and regulations. Our
29primary source for these is the “Economic Freedom of the World (EFW)” database (see
Gwartney and Lawson [2004]). This database has been developed under the auspices of
the Fraser Institute in Canada with the aid of a worldwide network of economists and
research institutes. In particular, we use indicators referring to hiring and ﬁring practices,
regulation of business activities and integrity of the legal system.
Despite other indicators available in the literature for developing and emerging economies
(e.g., the World Bank Doing Business database), the EFW tracks changes in regulations
over time and is thus more suitable for our analysis of job ﬂows that have indeed been
inﬂuenced by policy changes over the period covered by our data (see Table 11 for details
on the regulatory variables).
Table 11: Institutional Variables, 1990s
OVERALL
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hiring and Firing Practices 5.261 1.515 2.878 7.700
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Practices 4.113 2.019 0.000 7.209
Business Regulations 3.490 1.389 1.100 5.900
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.490 1.233 0.000 4.600
Law and Order 2.280 2.818 0.000 10.000
EU & USA
Hiring and Firing Practices 5.427 1.804 2.878 7.400
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Practices 5.084 1.559 2.878 6.600
Business Regulations 3.074 1.682 1.100 5.600
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.822 1.349 1.100 4.600
Law and Order 0.469 1.121 0.000 3.000
LAC
Hiring and Firing Restrictions 4.679 0.943 3.230 5.740
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Restrictions 2.249 1.642 0.000 4.431
Business Regulations 4.206 1.297 2.617 5.900
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 1.811 1.321 0.000 3.320
Law and Order 4.949 2.769 2.280 10.000
TRANSITION
Hiring and Firing Restrictions 5.696 1.705 3.586 7.700
Law&Order adj. Hiring and Firing Restrictions 4.742 1.846 3.079 7.209
Business Regulations 3.323 0.669 2.650 4.200
Law&Order adj. Business Regulations 2.757 0.716 1.776 3.486
Law and Order 1.763 1.119 0.637 3.300
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database and Gwartney and
Lawson [2004].
The EFW indicator of hiring and ﬁring restrictions is measured on a scale of 0 to 10,
30with 10 being the worst (most restrictive). The average of this indicator is the highest in
transition countries (5.70), followed by the OECD sample (5.43) and Latin America (4.68).
This synthetic indicator passes simple validation tests. For example, its correlation with
a similar indicator of employment protection legislation developed by the OECD is 0.85,
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.11
In the sensitivity analysis, we also consider an EFW synthetic indicator of regula-
tions in the product market. Regulations aﬀecting markets for goods and services have a
strong impact on the degree of competition and the pace and eﬀectiveness of reallocation
of resources, including labor. Thus, more restrictive regulations that stiﬂe product market
competition are also likely to inﬂuence job ﬂows. The business regulation indicator is a
simple average of ﬁve diﬀerent indicators: price controls; administrative conditions and
new business; time with government bureaucracy; starting a new business; and irregular
payments. These ﬁve indicators are designed to identify the extent to which regulatory
restraints and bureaucratic procedures limit competition and the operation of goods and
services markets. Business regulation is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the
most restrictive. This indicator is on average the highest in Latin America (4.21), followed
by transition countries (3.32) and OECD countries (3.07).
The EFW indicator of law and order is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10
being the worst. The average of this indicator is highest in Latin America (4.95), followed
by transition countries (1.76) and the OECD sample (0.47). Appendix A contains more
detailed deﬁnitions of the variables used in our analysis.
5.4 The Baseline Speciﬁcation
In our empirical investigation, we start with a baseline speciﬁcation in which we only
include the U.S. job ﬂow benchmark and the country dummies (equation (2). We then test
for diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcient of the U.S. job ﬂow benchmark across the three
regions for which we have data (OECD countries, Latin America and transition economies).
Further, we allow the coeﬃcient of the U.S. job ﬂow variable to vary by ﬁrm size class.
11We check the robustness of our results by using an alternative measure of employment protection
legislation, the OECD EPL index. Since this measure is not available for Latin America and transition
countries in the early 1990s, we augmented it in two ways. First, for transition countries we used data on
EPL collected by Haltiwanger et al. [2003]. Second, for Latin America we imputed EPL by regressing a
measure of hiring and ﬁring practices from the Fraser Institute on EPL for transition and OECD countries
and then using the estimated coeﬃcient to calculate EPL. EPL is measured on a scale from 0 to 4, with
4 being the worst (most restrictive). It is on average the strictest in OECD (2.35) and the least strict in
Latin America (1.73).
31Table 12 presents the results for these three alternative speciﬁcations and for the
two samples discussed above (1989-2001 for all countries, and restricted to 1996-2001 for
transition economies). As expected, the estimated coeﬃcient of the U.S. job ﬂow is highly
signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the bivariate correlation analysis discussed above. However, the
estimated coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly less than one, suggesting that, other things being equal,
the responsiveness to market and technologically driven factors that aﬀect reallocation
in the U.S. is less than one. This ﬁnding is interesting by itself since it suggests that
market driven and technological factors are not perfectly correlated across countries. Or
put diﬀerently, it is consistent with the view that countries around the world have factors
that impede the reallocation process.12
If we then allow the coeﬃcient on the U.S. job ﬂow to vary by region (EU, Latin
America and transition economies), we notice that there is a closer link between cross in-
dustry/size diﬀerences in gross job ﬂows between the United States and the Latin American
countries than between the United States and the European Union countries. If we restrict
the analysis to the 1996-2001 period for the transition economies, we see that the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on U.S. job ﬂows (column (5)) declines to a level that is not statistically
diﬀerent from that of the EU countries. In other words, as the process of economic trans-
formation has progressed, the transition economies have seen the pace of job reallocation
slow down and the cross-industry/size variance converge towards the values observed in
the EU countries.
The next step in our preliminary analysis is to diﬀerentiate the coeﬃcient on the U.S.
job ﬂow by ﬁrm size. Perhaps not surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient is the highest
for the smallest size class (1-19 employees) and declines monotonically for the larger size
classes. In other words, the patterns of cross industry job ﬂows in the United States
and other countries are more similar among small ﬁrms than among larger ﬁrms, possibly
because small ﬁrms are exempt from certain regulations and/or can more easily avoid other
regulations. Hence, small ﬁrms show a degree of dynamism that is closer to that of the
frictionless economy. For larger ﬁrms, regulations are likely to be more binding, especially
in those industries that are inherently more volatile.
12Appropriate caution needs to be used in interpreting the magnitude of the coeﬃcient since measurement
error can drive the coeﬃcient below one. Still, we ﬁnd it interesting that this coeﬃcient is, in general,
less than one, and that the pattern of variation in the magnitude of this coeﬃcient across regions and size
classes is consistent with our interpretation.
325.5 Regulations and Job Flows
The next step in our analysis is to look at the possible impact that labor regulations have
on observed job ﬂows (Table 13). We focus on the restricted sample for the transition
economies as discussed above. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation (column (1)) is a simple cross-country
estimate in which we include the U.S. job ﬂow benchmark and the labor regulation indi-
cator, but we do not interact the latter with the U.S. benchmark. These results are only
preliminary, not least given the possible omitted variable bias due to the exclusion of coun-
try ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcient of the synthetic indicator of the stringency of
hiring and ﬁring regulations is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
This result is largely unchanged if we allow the coeﬃcient on the U.S. job ﬂow benchmark
to vary across the three regions (column (2)).
The next step is moving to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis by focusing on the
variation of job ﬂows across industry/size classes within each country. Column (3) presents
the basic model with the U.S. job ﬂow benchmark and its interaction with the hiring and
ﬁring labor regulation variable, plus country ﬁxed eﬀects (as in equation (4) above). We
ﬁnd that the interaction term is negatively signed but not statistically signiﬁcant at the
conventional level. This result holds even if we diﬀerentiate the eﬀect of labor regulations
by region.
Previous research (see, e.g., Caballero et al. [2004], Heckman and Pages [2004]) sug-
gests that the degree of enforcement of labor regulations - as well as other regulations -
varies across our sample of countries that include the OECD countries, Latin American
and transition economies. Not only are some ﬁrms and jobs not registered in Latin Amer-
ica and increasingly in the transition economies and some Southern European countries,
registered ﬁrms may also not fully comply with the existing rules and regulations. As an
indication of the diﬀerent degree of enforcement of laws and regulations, we consider the
law and order indicator from the Fraser Institute (based on the Political Risk Component
I (Law and Order) from the International Country Risk Guide, ranging from 0 to 10, 10
being the worst).13 The indicator shows the highest compliance with laws and regulations
in the OECD sample of countries (average of 0.56), followed with the transition economies
(average of 1.76), and by the Latin American countries (average of 4.96).
To control for possibly diﬀering degrees of enforcement of laws and regulations we
13Micco and Pages [2004] also make an attempt at controlling for diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of
regulations by using an indicator of rules of laws and government eﬀectiveness (see Kaufmann et al. [2004]).
We used the Fraser index of law and order because it is available for the time period for which our job
ﬂows data are available for the diﬀerent countries.








Columns (5) and (6) in Table 13 show the estimated eﬀect of the interaction between
the U.S. job ﬂow and the adjusted labor regulation variable without and with diﬀerentiation
by region. It is indeed noticeable that, once we control for the diﬀerence in the degree of
enforcement across countries, the interaction between hiring and ﬁring regulations and U.S.
job ﬂows becomes strongly signiﬁcant overall (column (5)), and in each of the sub regions
(column (6)) when we allow the coeﬃcient of the interaction to vary. In other words,
once we control for enforcement, we ﬁnd that intrinsically more volatile industries and size
classes present lower levels of gross job turnover relative to the less volatile industries and
size classes in countries with more stringent hiring and ﬁring regulations. Interestingly,
once we control for the enforcement of labor regulations, the estimated coeﬃcient of the
technology variable (the U.S. job ﬂow benchmark) is closer to unity. Thus a signiﬁcant
fraction of less than perfect correlation in the magnitude of job ﬂows in the countries in
the sample with the United States can be explained by restrictive labor regulations that
raise labor adjustment costs.
How sizeable is the estimated impact of labor regulation on job ﬂows? Given our
estimation approach, we consider the eﬀect of labor regulations in reducing job reallocation
between two industries at the extremes of the labor ﬂexibility requirement. Using the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term in column (5) of Table 13, we estimate that the diﬀerence
in job reallocation between industry/size cells with a high ﬂexibility requirement (90th
percentile of the ﬂexibility distribution in the United States) and industry/size cells with a
low ﬂexibility requirement (10th percentile of the same distribution) will be 4.5 percentage
points lower in a country with the highest index of hiring and ﬁring regulations compared
to the United States, the country with the least restrictive regulations. Considering that
the average job reallocation rate is around 25 percent in the sample used in the regression,
the estimated impact is indeed sizeable.15
14There is no indication in Gwartney and Lawson [2004] that the original regulatory variables consider
the enforcement of regulations in addition to the statutes.
15The estimated value is obtained as follows:
β [(USJflow90th − USJflow10th)(HFmax − HFmin)]
where β is the estimated coeﬃcient, and USJflow and HF are the job reallocation in the United States
and the indicator of hiring and ﬁring regulations corrected for the degree of enforcement, respectively.
Micco and Pages [2004], using a similar approach, estimated an impact of 5.7 percentage point. Their
country sample and period of observation were diﬀerent from ours but the results are close.
34Table 12: Job Flows - A Baseline Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis
1990s 1990s, transition late 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0524∗∗∗ 0.1153∗∗∗ 0.1376∗∗∗ 0.1810∗∗∗
[0.0100] [0.0118] [0.0118] [0.0095] [0.0109] [0.0107]
USA SUM 0.7097∗∗∗ 0.6621∗∗∗
[0.0183] [0.0173]
USA SUM ∗EU 0.5860∗∗∗ 0.5746∗∗∗
[0.0288] [0.0274]
USA SUM ∗Transition 0.8282∗∗∗ 0.6878∗∗∗
[0.0325] [0.0308]
USA SUM ∗LAC 0.7493∗∗∗ 0.7493∗∗∗
[0.0329] [0.0312]
USA SUM ∗<20 Workers 0.5628∗∗∗ 0.5385∗∗∗
[0.0227] [0.0215]
USA SUM ∗20-49 Workers 0.3975∗∗∗ 0.3875∗∗∗
[0.0317] [0.0301]
USA SUM ∗50-99 Workers 0.3157∗∗∗ 0.3169∗∗∗
[0.0351] [0.0333]
USA SUM ∗100+ Workers 0.1764∗∗∗ 0.2090∗∗∗
[0.0566] [0.0537]
Observations 935 935 935 940 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.73
Standard errors in brackets. ∗signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. All regressions
include country dummies. USA SUM: industry/size job reallocation in the United States. EU denotes the
OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes
the countries in Latin America.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
3
5Table 13: Job Flows and the Role of Labor Regulations (Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1815∗∗∗ 0.2062∗∗∗ 0.0930∗∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0016 0.0513∗∗∗
[0.0341] [0.0354] [0.0290] [0.0138] [0.0100] [0.0140]
USA SUM 0.6588∗∗∗ 0.8417∗∗∗ 0.7047∗∗∗ 0.8602∗∗∗ 0.8541∗∗∗
[0.0426] [0.2010] [0.0835] [0.1016] [0.0490]
USA SUM ∗EU 0.5660∗∗∗
[0.0390]
USA SUM ∗Transition 0.6876∗∗∗
[0.0466]




USA SUM ∗EPL -0.032
[0.0311]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) -0.0452∗∗
[0.0182]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗EU -0.0211
[0.0138]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗EU -0.0484∗∗∗
[0.0097]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗Transition -0.0057
[0.0146]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗Transition -0.0361∗∗∗
[0.0113]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗LAC 0.0127
[0.0182]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗LAC -0.0450∗∗
Continued on next page.
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6Table 13: Job Flows and the Role of Labor Regulations (Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis) (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[0.0183]
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.56 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69
Standard errors in brackets. ∗signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. Columns (1) and (2) include
region dummies. Columns (3)-(6) include country dummies. USA SUM: industry/size job reallocation in the United
States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL is the index of stringency of hiring and ﬁring regulations. EPL
(Adj) is the indicator of hiring and ﬁring adjusted to take into account diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of regulations
(see main text).
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
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75.6 The Diﬀerential Eﬀects of Regulations on Small and Large
Firms
The next step in our analysis is to look at the possibly diﬀerent eﬀect of labor regulations on
job ﬂows of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Table 14 presents regressions in which we estimate the
coeﬃcient on the interaction between the benchmark U.S. job ﬂow and the hiring and ﬁring
regulatory indicator for ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Column (1) considers the hiring and ﬁring
indicator without controlling for the diﬀerent degree of enforcement of laws and regulations.
Interestingly, once the interaction eﬀect is allowed to vary across ﬁrm size classes, the
estimated eﬀect is negatively signed and statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional level
for all size classes. Moreover, the estimated impact of stringent regulations on the variance
of job ﬂows across industries increases with ﬁrm size. As hypothesized above, smaller
ﬁrms are often either exempt from certain regulations or can more easily stay below the
radar screen of regulators and law enforcement authorities. The estimated negative impact
of labor regulations on job ﬂows is almost twice as strong in large ﬁrms (more than 100
employees) compared to micro units (fewer than 20 employees).
Column (2) of Table 14 presents a similar speciﬁcation in which we control for the
diﬀerent degree of enforcement of regulations. Controlling for such eﬀects yields larger
coeﬃcients and a larger magnitude of the impact of labor regulations on job ﬂows. As in
the previous case, the estimated eﬀect of labor regulations increases with the size of ﬁrms.16
Appropriate care and caution is required to interpret the interaction eﬀects estimated
in Table 14 with respect to employer size. Recall that small businesses systematically
have higher job reallocation rates than larger businesses in all countries including the U.S.
benchmark. As such, the results in Table 13 imply that industry/size cells with a higher
U.S. benchmark will have the ﬂow reduced by labor market regulations that are enforced.
For Table 14, this implies that in comparing coeﬃcients across size class interactions, the
magnitudes are comparable for a given U.S. benchmark rate. That is, the absolute eﬀect
is larger for large businesses than small businesses for a given U.S. benchmark rate. But
given that small businesses have a higher U.S. benchmark rate this variation tends to work
in the opposite direction.
Another step in our analysis is aimed at assessing the robustness of our results to
the inclusion of regulations in the goods and services markets in our speciﬁcation. As
discussed above, regulations in diﬀerent markets tend to be highly correlated, i.e. countries
that impose strict rules of hiring and ﬁring also tend to impose more restrictive regulations
16Also in this case, the results are robust to the use of the excess labor reallocation. See Appendix B for
more details.
38Table 14: Job Flows by Firm Size - the Role of Labor and Product Market Regulations
(Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.1225∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.1150∗∗∗ 0.0660∗∗∗
[0.0126] [0.0131] [0.0109] [0.0147]
USA SUM 0.8379∗∗∗ 0.8579∗∗∗ 0.8401∗∗∗ 0.8371∗∗∗
[0.0700] [0.0409] [0.0988] [0.0435]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) -0.0546∗∗
[0.0203]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗<20 workers -0.0499∗∗∗
[0.0124]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗<20 workers -0.0632∗∗∗ -0.0540∗∗∗
[0.0090] [0.0139]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗20-49 Workers -0.0739∗∗∗
[0.0129]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers -0.0895∗∗∗ -0.0649∗∗∗
[0.0100] [0.0188]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗50-99 Workers -0.0853∗∗∗
[0.0131]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers -0.1012∗∗∗ -0.0793∗∗∗
[0.0104] [0.0206]
USA SUM ∗EPL ∗100+ Workers -0.0997∗∗∗
[0.0148]
USA SUM ∗EPL (Adj) ∗100+ Workers -0.1140∗∗∗ -0.0537∗
[0.0133] [0.0319]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) 0.0235
[0.0255]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗<20 Workers -0.0096
[0.0225]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers -0.037
[0.0309]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers -0.0321
[0.0338]
USA SUM ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗100+Workers -0.1003∗
[0.0530]
Observations 940 940 940 940
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.73
Standard errors in brackets. ∗signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. All regressions
include country dummies. USA SUM: industry/size job reallocation in the United States. EU denotes the
OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes
the countries in Latin America. EPL is the index of stringency of hiring and ﬁring regulations. EPL
(Adj) is the indicator of hiring and ﬁring adjusted to take into account diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of
regulations (see main text). Bus. Reg. is the indicator of the stringency of business regulations. Bus. Reg.
(Adj) is the same indicator adjusted to take into account diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of regulations.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
39on the goods and services markets. There are also speciﬁc aspects of product market
regulations that can inﬂuence job ﬂows over and above labor regulations. For example, since
a signiﬁcant fraction of overall job ﬂows is due to the entry and exit of ﬁrms, regulations
aﬀecting the start up of a new business, as well as bankruptcy rules that aﬀect the exit of
low performing units, may aﬀect job ﬂows. Likewise, regulations aﬀecting price setting by
ﬁrms and their relations with the public administration and their clients can all inﬂuence
incentives for ﬁrms to expand, adopt new technologies and adjust their workforce.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 14 show the results of estimating the job ﬂow regressions
controlling for our synthetic indicator of business regulations. We correct both labor and
product market regulations by the degree of enforcement proxied by the law and order indi-
cator. In column (3), we do not diﬀerentiate the interactions between U.S. reallocation and
regulations by ﬁrm size, while we do so in the last column of the table. Including the inter-
action between product market regulations and U.S. job ﬂows does not dramatically alter
our results. Whether we diﬀerentiate the impact of regulations by ﬁrm size or not, the esti-
mated eﬀects of the interaction between U.S. job reallocation and labor regulations remain
negatively signed and highly statistically signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcients on the product
market regulations are generally not statistically signiﬁcant. However, once we diﬀerentiate
eﬀects by ﬁrm size, we notice that the only statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of product market
regulations is among large businesses (greater than 100 employees). Moreover, controlling
for product market regulations reduces the estimated impact of labor regulations for those
ﬁrms. In other words, for large ﬁrms product market regulations play an important role in
curbing labor reallocation over and above labor regulations. Intermediate ﬁrms (those in
between 20 and 99 employees) seem to be the most adversely aﬀected by stringent labor
regulations that raise labor adjustment costs. In terms of magnitude, note that stringent
labor market regulation is associated with a 4.4 percentage points drop in job reallocation
for micro ﬁrms, 3.7 percentage points drop for small ﬁrms, 4.1 percentage points drop for
medium ﬁrms, and a 1.6 percentage points drop in job reallocation for large ﬁrms. Stringent
product market regulation, on the other hand, has the largest impact on job reallocation
by large ﬁrms: it is associated with a 1.9 percentage points drop.17
17We obtain these magnitudes by multiplying the coeﬃcient by the standard deviation of enforcement
adjusted regulatory variables and average U.S. job reallocation in the corresponding cell.
405.7 Do regulations inﬂuence the various margins of labor reallo-
cation diﬀerently?
So far we have focused on the eﬀects of regulations in labor and product markets on
overall job reallocation. In this section we want to explore whether such regulations have
a diﬀerent impact on the diﬀerent margins of reallocation, namely on job ﬂows due to the
entry and exit of ﬁrms in the market and those due to reallocation among incumbents
(see Table 15).18 Column (1) shows that cross-cell variation in job reallocation by entering
and exiting ﬁrms in the Latin American countries is very similar to the variation observed
in the United States, which is the reason for the close link between cross industry/size
variation in job reallocation between the United States and the Latin American countries
(see Table 14), given that the coeﬃcient on U.S. job reallocation for continuing ﬁrms in
Latin America is much lower in magnitude (see column (2) of Table 15). The link between
cross industry/size diﬀerences in job reallocation is not as close between the United States
and the EU and transition countries, and there is not much diﬀerence in the strength of
the link for entering/exiting businesses and for continuing businesses.
Column (3) of Table 15 shows the results of estimating the job ﬂow regressions for
entering and exiting ﬁrms, controlling for labor and product market regulations corrected
by the degree of enforcement and diﬀerentiating the impact of both by ﬁrm size. Column
(4) does the same for continuing ﬁrms. The results suggest a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of labor market regulation (interacted with U.S. job reallocation) on labor
mobility generated by entering and exiting ﬁrms for all but large ﬁrms. The coeﬃcients
are also more than twice as large in magnitude as the corresponding coeﬃcients in column
(4) of Table 14, and they are about the same magnitude for micro, small and medium
entering and exiting ﬁrms. However, in order to correctly assess the magnitude of the
impact, we need to remember that the magnitude of job reallocation varies signiﬁcantly
by size class. Taking that into account, note that stringent labor market regulation has
the biggest impact on job reallocation by micro entering and exiting ﬁrms: it is associated
with a 4.6 percentage points drop in job reallocation by such ﬁrms. The impact on small,
medium and large ﬁrms is lower: stringent labor market regulation is associated with a 2.5,
2.2 and 0.5 percentage points drop in job reallocation, respectively.
The estimated eﬀects of product market regulation (interacted with U.S. job reallo-
18We focus on the combined ﬂows due to entry and exit of ﬁrms because of the very high correlations
between entry and exit across industries in most countries. This in turn suggests that entries and exits
are largely part of a creative destruction process in which entry and exit reﬂect within sector reallocation
reﬂecting idiosyncratic diﬀerences across ﬁrms within sectors (see Bartelsman et al. [2004] for evidence
based on the same dataset used in this paper, as well as Geroski [1991], Baldwin and Gorecki [1991]).
41Table 15: Job Flows by Firm Size, Entering, Exiting and Continuing Firms - the Role of
Labor and Product Market Regulations (Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis))
Entry & Exit Continuers Entry & Exit Continuers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.0074 0.0241∗∗ 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0610∗∗∗
[0.0054] [0.0094] [0.0058] [0.0116]
USA SUM 1.0809∗∗∗ 0.4742∗∗∗
[0.0454] [0.0615]
USA SUM ∗EU 0.5730∗∗∗ 0.5118∗∗∗
[0.0307] [0.0372]
USA SUM ∗Transition 0.6835∗∗∗ 0.6133∗∗∗
[0.0345] [0.0418]
USA SUM ∗LAC 0.9982∗∗∗ 0.4942∗∗∗
[0.0341] [0.0427]
USA SUM ∗ -0.1542∗∗∗ -0.0018
EPL (Adj) ∗<20 workers [0.0137] [0.0179]
USA SUM ∗ -0.1483∗∗∗ -0.0418∗
EPL (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers [0.0212] [0.0219]
USA SUM ∗ -0.1636∗∗∗ -0.0557∗∗
EPL (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers [0.0277] [0.0226]
USA SUM ∗ -0.1148 -0.0722∗∗
EPL (Adj) ∗100+ Workers [0.0738] [0.0304]
USA SUM ∗ 0.1010∗∗∗ 0.0007
Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗<20 Workers [0.0220] [0.0288]
USA SUM ∗ 0.0034 0.0404
Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers [0.0347] [0.0357]
USA SUM ∗ -0.0208 0.0546
Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers [0.0450] [0.0368]
USA SUM ∗ -0.2452∗∗ 0.0599
Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗100+Workers [0.1205] [0.0504]
Observations 946 934 946 934
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.55 0.75 0.58
Standard errors in brackets. ∗signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. All re-
gressions include country dummies. USA SUM (Entry & Exit): industry/size job reallocation due to
entering and exiting ﬁrms in the United States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Tran-
sition denotes the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin
America. EPL is the index of stringency of hiring and ﬁring regulations. EPL (Adj) is the indicator
of hiring and ﬁring adjusted to take into account diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of regulations (see
main text). Bus. Reg. is the indicator of the stringency of business regulations. Bus. Reg. (Adj) is
the same indicator adjusted to take into account diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of regulations.
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
cation) on job ﬂows by entering and exiting ﬁrms is not signiﬁcant for small and medium
ﬁrms, and is negative and signiﬁcant for large ﬁrms, while it is surprisingly positive for
micro ﬁrms. Given all the controls and interactions in this setting, care needs to be applied
in intepreting the coeﬃcients. However, the results suggest that labor market regulations
have a relatively larger adverse impact on entry and exit for micro ﬁrms while product mar-
42ket regulations have a relatively larger adverse impact on the entry and exit of larger ﬁrms.
For continuing ﬁrms, labor market regulation is more important than product market regu-
lation, as the results in column (4) demonstrate. The coeﬃcients are smaller in magnitude
than the ones in column (4) of Table 14, but the basic result holds: the estimated impact
of stringent regulations on the variance of job ﬂows across industries increases with ﬁrm
size. Stringent labor market regulation is associated with a 1.9, 2.1 and 1.7 percentage
points drop in job reallocation by continuing large, medium and small ﬁrms, respectively.
However, we can now see that the impact on larger ﬁrms is through the impact on larger
continuing ﬁrms.
These results conﬁrm the importance of labor market regulations in shaping labor
adjustment patterns, particularly so in those industries and size classes where technological
and market factors require more frequent employment changes. However, controlling for
other regulations inﬂuencing ﬁrm behavior also inﬂuences job ﬂows. In addition, labor
market regulations are especially important for entering and exiting ﬁrms, especially for
micro, small and medium ﬁrms, which presumably face more hardship in adjusting to
changing market conditions (for example, demand) than large ﬁrms and ﬁnd labor market
regulations (such as ﬁring costs) too restrictive. Even though small ﬁrms are often either
exempt from certain regulations or can more easily stay below the radar of regulators, this
appears to be easier for continuing small ﬁrms than for entering or exiting small ﬁrms. The
impact of labor market regulations on larger ﬁrms is primarily on the adjustment of labor
for continuing ﬁrms.
5.8 Sensitivity Analysis
In the empirical analysis, we control for country, industry and size eﬀects, as well as for
unobservable eﬀects using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach. Moreover, we test the ro-
bustness of results for hiring and ﬁring regulations by including other regulatory variables.
However, the use of quasi panel data may still run the risk that results are driven by
the inclusion of a speciﬁc country or industry in the sample that drives the results in a
given direction. The use of an unbalanced panel on the industry dimension makes this risk
potentially more serious.
To test for the robustness of results to changes in the sample, we re-estimate our two
preferred speciﬁcations - columns (2) and (4) in Table 14 - removing one country or one
industry at a time from the sample. Figures 4 and 5 present the estimated coeﬃcients on
enforcement-adjusted hiring and ﬁring regulations interacted with job reallocation in the
United States, diﬀerentiated by size classes, in the speciﬁcation without and with control
43for business regulations.
The results show a remarkable stability of the estimated coeﬃcient for the interaction
term to changes in the sample along the country or the industry dimension. The point
coeﬃcient estimates for the interaction term are always negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
The most sensitive coeﬃcients are those for the largest size class - 100 or more employees -
where the exclusion of Chile or Portugal leads to a stronger estimated eﬀect of regulations.
Not surprisingly given the unbalanced nature of the sample, the exclusion of ﬁnance and
business activities as well as construction tend to strengthen the estimated negative eﬀects
of regulations on job reallocation.
6 Conclusion
This paper exploits a rich new database with harmonized data on job ﬂows across industries
and size classes for 16 industrial and emerging economies over the past decade. We ﬁnd
that all countries in our sample exhibit sizeable annual gross job ﬂows. Industry and
size class eﬀects together account for a very large share of the overall variability in job
ﬂows across country, industry and size class cells (e.g., over 50 percent of the variation
in the summary measure of job reallocation is accounted for by industry and size eﬀects
interacted together). Interestingly, the most important factor here is employer size. Small
businesses exhibit a substantially higher pace of job creation and destruction and this
pattern is pervasive across industries and countries. Moreover, industry eﬀects play a large
role as well. Taken together, it is clear that some form of technology, cost and demand
factors that are common across countries account for the bulk of the variation in job ﬂows.
Nevertheless, even after controlling for industry/technology and size factors, there remain
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in job ﬂows across countries that could reﬂect diﬀerences in business
environment conditions.
Our harmonized ﬁrm-level dataset allows us to look at two factors shaping the busi-
ness environment - regulations on the hiring and ﬁring of workers and business regulations.
To minimize the possible endogeneity and omitted variable problems associated with cross-
country regressions, we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach. The empirical results sug-
gest that stringent hiring and ﬁring regulations (and their consistent enforcement) reduce
job turnover, especially in industry and size class cells that inherently exhibit more job
turnover. To capture the latter, we use the United States patterns as a benchmark to
identify and quantify industry/size class cells with inherently higher job turnover. Labor
regulations also distort the patterns of ﬂows across industry and size classes within a coun-
44Figure 4: Sensitivity Analysis: Estimated Coeﬃcient on Enforcement Adjusted Hiring
and Firing Regulations Interacted with U.S. Job Reallocation and 95% Conﬁ-
dence Intervals, Excluding One Country or One Sector at a Time, Labor Market
Regulations (Column (2) from Table 14)
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
45Figure 5: Sensitivity Analysis: Estimated Coeﬃcient on Enforcement Adjusted Hiring
and Firing Regulations Interacted with U.S. Job Reallocation and 95% Conﬁ-
dence Intervals, Excluding One Country or One Sector at a Time, Labor and
Product Market Regulations (Column (4) from Table 14)
Source: Own calculations based on harmonized ﬁrm-level database.
46try. Interestingly, even though medium and large ﬁrms have lower average ﬂows, holding
the magnitude of the U.S. benchmark rates constant, medium and large ﬁrms are more
severely aﬀected by stringent labor regulations within a country. Labor reallocation by
existing small ﬁrms is less aﬀected (for a given pace of reallocation in the U.S. benchmark),
probably because they are in some cases exempt from such regulations or can more easily
circumvent them. However, stringent labor regulations disproportionally aﬀect the entry
and exit of small ﬁrms and their associated job creation and destruction. Overall, business
regulations have a smaller impact than labor regulations on job ﬂows. Business regula-
tions seem to aﬀect mainly the entry and exit of larger businesses and the associated job
reallocation.
Much work remains to be done to understand the implications of our ﬁndings. They
provide evidence that stringent labor regulations have an impact on reallocation dynamics.
It is a much larger step to demonstrate that stringent labor regulations have an adverse
impact on the eﬃcient allocation of labor in a manner consistent with the predictions
of Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993]. To explore the latter, we need to measure not only
reallocation but also productivity at the micro level. A number of studies have found
that allocative eﬃciency is important for understanding diﬀerences across time, industries
and countries in the level and growth of productivity (see, e.g., Foster et al. [2001] and
Bartelsman et al. [2005]). Putting those ﬁndings together with those in this paper certainly
suggests that stringent labor market regulations may have an important adverse impact
on allocative eﬃciency and in turn productivity levels and growth. However, much work
(including additional data infrastructure development) is needed to bring all of the pieces
together to explore these important issues.
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50A Deﬁnitions of Institutional Variables
Variable Deﬁnition
Hiring and Firing Practices Flexibility in hiring and ﬁring (5B(ii)) from Fraser Insti-
tute, hiring and ﬁring practices of companies are deter-
mined by private contract (World Economic Forum: Global
Competitiveness Report); scale [0,10], 10 being the worst.
Business Regulations Regulation of business activities (5c) from Fraser Institute
(World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report);
scale [0,10], 10 being the worst.
Law and Order Integrity of Legal System (2e) from Fraser Institute, which
is based on Political Risk Component I (Law and Order)
from the International Country Risk Guide; scale [0,10], 10
being the worst.
51B Results for Excess Job Flows
Table B.1: Job Flows - A Baseline Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis
1990s 1990s, transition late 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1048∗∗∗ 0.1351∗∗∗ 0.1513∗∗∗ -0.0279∗∗∗ 0.0022 0.0256∗∗
[0.0094] [0.0106] [0.0119] [0.0090] [0.0106] [0.0118]
USA EXC 0.6900∗∗∗ 0.6795∗∗∗
[0.0186] [0.0181]
USA EXC ∗EU 0.5602∗∗∗ 0.5624∗∗∗
[0.0292] [0.0287]
USA EXC ∗Transition 0.7596∗∗∗ 0.7223∗∗∗
[0.0335] [0.0322]
USA EXC ∗LAC 0.7878∗∗∗ 0.7854∗∗∗
[0.0329] [0.0323]
USA EXC ∗<20 Workers 0.5973∗∗∗ 0.5867∗∗∗
[0.0270] [0.0259]
USA EXC ∗20-49 Workers 0.4793∗∗∗ 0.4501∗∗∗
[0.0376] [0.0360]
USA EXC ∗50-99 Workers 0.4102∗∗∗ 0.3829∗∗∗
[0.0429] [0.0410]
USA EXC ∗100+ Workers 0.3491∗∗∗ 0.3311∗∗∗
[0.0741] [0.0712]
Observations 933 933 933 937 937 937
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.71
Standard errors in brackets. ∗signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. All regressions
include country dummies. USA EXC: industry/size job reallocation in the United States. EU denotes the
OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes
the countries in Latin America.
52Table B.2: Job Flows and the Role of Labor Regulations (Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analy-
sis)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.1649∗∗∗ 0.1946∗∗∗ -0.0217∗ -0.0104 -0.006 0.0056
[0.0278] [0.0292] [0.0113] [0.0130] [0.0113] [0.0131]
USA EXC 0.6769∗∗∗ 0.8363∗∗∗ 0.6473∗∗∗ 0.8892∗∗∗ 0.8457∗∗∗
[0.0516] [0.2100] [0.0888] [0.1267] [0.0507]
USA EXC ∗EU 0.5542∗∗∗
[0.0449]
USA EXC ∗Transition 0.7208∗∗∗
[0.0566]




USA EXC ∗EPL -0.0279
[0.0322]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) -0.0479∗
[0.0225]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗EU -0.0137
[0.0147]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) ∗EU -0.0496∗∗∗
[0.0100]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗Transition 0.0101
[0.0156]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) ∗Transition -0.0270∗∗
[0.0119]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗LAC 0.0319∗
[0.0190]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) ∗LAC -0.0248
[0.0185]
Observations 937 937 937 937 937 937
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.59 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.69
Standard errors in brackets. ∗signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. Columns (1)
and (2) include region dummies. Columns (3)-(6) include country dummies. USA EXC: industry/size
job reallocation in the United States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL is the index
of stringency of hiring and ﬁring regulations. EPL (Adj) is the indicator of hiring and ﬁring adjusted to
take into account diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of regulations (see main text).
53Table B.3: Job Flows and the Role of Labor and Product Market Regulations (Diﬀerence-
in-Diﬀerence Analysis)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0490∗∗∗
[0.0128] [0.0140] [0.0081] [0.0161]
USA EXC 0.8424∗∗∗ 0.8897∗∗∗ 0.8605∗∗∗ 0.8604∗∗∗
[0.0769] [0.0436] [0.1181] [0.0464]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) -0.0619∗∗
[0.0254]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗<20 workers -0.0432∗∗∗
[0.0137]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) ∗<20 workers -0.0612∗∗∗ -0.0696∗∗∗
[0.0100] [0.0167]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗20-49 Workers -0.0653∗∗∗
[0.0144]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers -0.0846∗∗∗ -0.0876∗∗∗
[0.0112] [0.0226]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗50-99 Workers -0.0772∗∗∗
[0.0148]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers -0.0977∗∗∗ -0.1140∗∗∗
[0.0119] [0.0255]
USA EXC ∗EPL ∗100+ Workers -0.0823∗∗∗
[0.0178]
USA EXC ∗EPL (Adj) ∗100+ Workers -0.0980∗∗∗ -0.0881∗∗
[0.0167] [0.0433]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) 0.0342
[0.0320]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗<20 Workers 0.0245
[0.0270]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗20-49 Workers 0.0151
[0.0369]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗50-99 Workers 0.0385
[0.0417]
USA EXC ∗Bus. Reg. (Adj) ∗100+Workers -0.0074
[0.0711]
Observations 937 937 937 937
Adjusted R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.68 0.71
Standard errors in brackets. ∗signiﬁcant at 10%, ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. All
regressions include country dummies. USA EXC: industry/size excess job reallocation in the
United States. EU denotes the OECD European countries. Transition denotes the countries in
Central and Eastern Europe. LAC denotes the countries in Latin America. EPL is the index
of stringency of hiring and ﬁring regulations. EPL (Adj) is the indicator of hiring and ﬁring
adjusted to take into account diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of regulations (see main text).
Bus. Reg. is the indicator of the stringency of business regulations; Bus. Reg. (Adj) is the same
indicator adjusted to take into account diﬀerent degrees of enforcement of regulations.
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